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BOOK REVIEW
SPEAKING OF RIGHTS
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE. By Mary Ann Glendon. New York, The Free
Press, 1991. Pp. 218. $24.95
Reviewed by Janet E. Ainsworth*
The thesis of Mary Ann Glendon's book Rights Talk is a provocative
one: that the way in which Americans talk about rights is dangerous to our
political and social well-being as a nation. Her avowed target is not the
assertion of any specific rights, although her rhetoric betrays that she
clearly has limited sympathy for progressive rights claims of the left.1
Instead, she contends that the form of rights discourse in the post-war
United States, rather than its substance, has done serious damage to our
contemporary political culture. In particular, Professor Glendon describes
our "dialect" of rights talk as having three major defects. First, she
observes that our rights discourse employs a rhetoric in which rights are
spoken of as absolute in character, without any limitation or qualification
on their scope or effect. Speaking of rights as though they were
incontrovertible "trumps" leads political debate into a dead end after the
mutual exchange of competing rights claims, inhibiting the chances for
political accommodation and compromise. Second, she sees rights
discourse as premised on an assumption that the fundamental unit of
society is the individual, an atomistic and autonomous self whose
paramount ideals of independence and self-reliance necessarily undermine
communitarian values and interests. Finally, she indicts our legal culture's
preoccupation with the vindication of rights to the exclusion of a
symmetrical discourse of duty and responsibility, resulting in an
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound.

1. See MARY A. GLENiDoN, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVEISHMENT OF POLiTICAL
DISCOURSE 5 (1991). For example, when discussing liberal and left-wing rights advocates
and their positions, she generally chooses language with vaguely disparaging or
trivializing connotations, as when she characterizes academics who championed civil
rights as "trendsetters," id., and describes the liberal federal courts and their "academic
admirers" as "propell[ing] each other like railwaymen on a handcar," id. at 7. In
contrast, when she discusses the conservative architects of property rights, her rhetoric
is neutral and devoid of editorial comment: they "strengthened the rights" and "extended
... penalties." Id. at 27.
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underdeveloped
consciousness of the individual's obligations to the
2

community.

Professor Glendon's book is an ambitious project, providing a
historical analysis of the philosophical roots of our contemporary legal
culture and drawing on her formidable knowledge of European legal
culture to present a contrasting rights discourse, which she suggests is
preferable to our own. Her project is marred to some extent by the
uneven scattershot nature of her critique, in which she mixes subtle and
compelling arguments with unsupported claims, which she treats as selfevident, but which are unpersuasive on their face. For example, among
the disastrous consequences that she attributes to rights discourse are "the
disdain for politics that is now so prevalent in the American scene," 3 "the
atrophy of vital local government and political parties," 4 and even the

prevalence of the "sound bite" in political campaigning.'

If rights

discourse is somehow to blame for these ills, as Professor Glendon claims,
then she owes it to the reader to spell out the causal connection, which is
by no means obvious.
2. See id. at 7, 14, 47-75, 109-44.
3. Id. at 5. The reasons why Americans are currently alienated from their political
system are a fit subject for the multitude of sociology dissertations undoubtedly in
progress. No doubt these dissertations will discuss such factors as the rise of big-money
political action committee (PAC)-dominated elections, which deprive ordinary voters of
a sense of significance in the electoral process, the increasing prominence of highly
abstract political problems with obscure origins and cures such as the savings and loan
debacle, and the dawning recognition that developments in the world economy are
making the political system largely irrelevant to the struggle of average Americans to
achieve or even to maintain a middle-class standard of living. All of these factors seem
far more compelling explanations for our political malaise than the purported influence
of rights discourse on the body politic. Cf Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term
Limits, 80 GEo. L.J. 477, 479 (1992) (summarizing popular discontent with the United
States political system, including the impression that it suffers from "legislative
insularity, voter apathy, and special interest influence"); Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Note,
Modelling Campaign Contributions: The Market for Access and Its Implications for
Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891 (1992) (discussing the unpopularity of special interest
groups in American politics and proposing a solution to the problem with respect to
campaign contributions).
4. GLENDON, supranote 1, at 5.
5. id. atix-xi. A more plausible account of why political discourseis being reduced
to ever-shortening "sound bites" would need to address the increased prominence of the
electronic media in shaping the collective political consciousness. See, e.g., Ronald K.
L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers,68
TEX. L. REV. 1087,1095-1107 (1990) (suggesting that television technology, particularly
in the context of its overwhelmingly commercial orientation in the United States, has
caused public political discussion to be condensed into progressively shorter and more
visually appealing "sound bites").
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It would be unfortunate, however, if the presence of sweeping and
conclusory pronouncements such as these served to undermine the
credibility of her more considered observations on rights discourse, which
are worthy of a sustained examination. Glendon's critical assessment of
American popular legal culture, laden with perceptive observations and
cogent reflections, cannot be lightly dismissed. Nevertheless, for all of the
power and scope of her communitarian social critique, Glendon's main
thesis is fundamentally flawed because, paradoxically, she both overstates
the negative impact of rights discourse and underestimates the magnitude
of its positive significance.
Glendon's central claim is that rights discourse is so seductive that it
precludes us from developing any alternative form of political discourse
and thus prevents us from discussing political issues not susceptible to
formulation in rights terminology. 6 Now, it may be true that the
characteristics of any particular language, both grammatical and lexical,
operate to constrain thought by limiting what is potentially available to be
expressed within that language. 7 Glendon is. saying more, however, than
that the absence of an appropriate political vocabulary prevents us from
saying certain things; she is claiming that the presence of rights talk in our
culture acts to preempt the field of political discourse and precludes our
development of the vocabulary necessary to address important issues.
According to her analogy, we are like travellers in a foreign country
limited to saying only a few stock phrases, unable to converse freely with
the natives.' Her own analogy, however, undermines her point. Surely a
tourist who has learned a few phrases in a foreign language is not thereby
inhibited from learning others, particularly if the need for them arises. In
arguing that rights discourse precludes other kinds of political expression,
Glendon has implicitly adopted another metaphor-that public discourse
6. See GLENDN, supra note 1, at 14-15.

7. For a discussion of this idea, generally referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis
after its anthropologist proponents Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, see JOHN LYONS,
LANGUAOE AND LiNOUISmcS 303-12 (1981). While the Sapir-Whorf assertion about
grammatical constraints on thought is controversial, its claim that vocabulary functions

as a constraint on expression has been influential in contemporary legal theory. For
instance, feminist legal scholars have observed that significant harms to women remain
invisible to the justice system unless and until they are given a name. Only when the
wrong is named can the law fashion a remedy. See, e.g., Martha A. Mahoney, Legal

Images of BatteredWomen: Redefining the Issue ofSeparation,90 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 6871 (1991) (discussing how the creation of the term "date rape" made a category of
hitherto-unredressed sexual abuse legally cognizable and urging the adoption of the term
"separation assault" to give legal recognition to the presently invisible experiences of
battered women).
8. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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is a container with a finite capacity.9 Once "filled" with rights talk, the
"container" of public discourse has no room for other political or
normative discourse. The problem with this metaphor for discourse is that
it is an unexamined metaphor whose validity is never substantiated.
Perhaps public discourse actually does "fill up" with some kinds of talk
to the exclusion of other potential talk, but Glendon gives the reader no
basis upon which to judge the plausibility of this phenomenon. Like many
of her other points, she simply presumes it to be self-evident.
One concrete example Glendon gives of a category of potential
discourse purportedly crowded out by rights talk is the discourse of
responsibility or duty, which she finds to be almost entirely absent from
our political and legal dialogue. By way of illustration, Glendon points to
the tort-law doctrine holding that, as a general matter, the law imposes no
duty upon a person to rescue another in peril, even if the rescue could be
accomplished easily and without danger to the potential rescuer.1" Yet,
she acknowledges that two American states, Vermont" and
Minnesota, 12 have enacted "duty to rescue" civil statutes.13 Presumably
these states, like the rest of America, are imbued with the rights culture
that Glendon posits as an impediment to a discourse of duty. 4 The fact
that two jurisdictions have implemented a tort duty to rescue tends to
impeach Glendon's claim that rights discourse is preventing a discourse of
duty from developing in the United States.
This evidence that rights discourse does not prevent the development
of new legal doctrines establishing duties should come as no surprise.
Legal theorists on the nature of rights have long conceptualized duties as
the natural concomitant of rights.1 Far from precluding a discourse of
9. In identifying an implicit metaphor within Glendon's thought, I do not mean to
suggest that the use of metaphors is inappropriate or wrong. Metaphor is one of the
primary ways in which any culture mediates cognitive processes; it is impossible to
imagine thought without metaphor. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS
WE LIVE BY 3-24 (1980). Container metaphors are one of the most common ontological
metaphors of thought. Id. at 29-32.
10. See GLENiON, supra note 1, at 88.
11. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
12. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp. 1990).
13. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 88.
14. See id. at 76-108.
15. Duties can be expressed as the inverse complement to rights. That is, if A has
a right against B, then B will have a duty to A to behave in accord with that right. To
say that A has a right against B that B stay off A's land is also to say that B has a
correlative duty to stay off A's land. For an influential taxonomy elegantly setting out
a matrix of correlations between rights and duties, privileges and powers, see Wesley N.
Hohfield, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23
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duty, rights discourse logically entails such talk. As every practicing
lawyer knows, rights can often be framed with equal effect and plausibility
as duties, and vice versa. For example, I cannot talk about my right not
to be denied a job due to my race, sex, or religion without implicitly
invoking the potential employer's duty not to consider those factors. If such

a case went to trial, it is likely that much of the courtroom rhetoric would
explicitly draw upon the language of breach of duty. In fact, it is

impossible to imagine the cross-examination of the employer without a
well-developed rhetoric of duty. Thus, even in civil-rights litigation,
lawyers must be fluent in duty talk as well as rights talk. 6
Glendon argues that rights discourse has been devastating to our

political system by encouraging citizens to bypass representative political
institutions in favor of appealing to the courts to achieve social justice. As
a result, the electoral political process has suffered from neglect and may
no longer be adequate to the challenges it now faces.17 To a large degree,
Glendon is correct in observing that those seeking full admission to the
body politic have tended to resort to the courts to vindicate their claims in

preference to relying upon grass-roots political organizing to accomplish
their substantive objectives. 18 Moreover, it is a valuable insight to point
out that reliance on the judiciary to create and to enforce rights can foster
the illusion that these rights are more permanent and secure than they are
YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley N. Hohfield, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfield, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions-19171.
16. Facility with duty discourseis even more central to lawyers engaged in contract
or tort litigation, traditionally characterized by a predominance of duty discourse over
rights discourse. See Hohfield, FundamentalLegalConceptions-1917,supranote 15, at
710.
17. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 6.
18. At one point, Glendon chides civil-rights activists for failing to "exploit...
fully ... the... one-person, one-vote decisions of the Supreme Court." Id. Apparently
for Glendon the only political organization that counts is participation in electoral
politics. This impoverished definition of political action demonstrates a lack of
appreciation for the grass-roots political mobilization of unprecedented scope and success
carried out by civil-rights activists within the community. Such organizing still stands as
a model for community-based political action today. See GERALD N. ROSENBERa, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRINo ABOUT SOCIAL CHANoE? 10-13 (1992). Legal
rights are limited by the beliefs and norms of contemporary legal culture, by the
conservatism of the judicial system, by the restrictions on standing for reform groups,
and by the limited effectiveness of legal arguments for attaining specific political
purposes or sustaining grass-roots involvement. Id.; see also Thomas R. Marshall, The
Supreme Court and the Grass Roots: Whom Does the Court Represent Best? 76
JUDICATURE 22 (1992) (analyzing Supreme Court voting patterns and doctrines and how
they represent grass-roots group attitudes).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL'LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

in actuality.19 Resorting to the judiciary to assert rights claims can only

be seen as a mistaken strategy if it is presumed that participation in the
electoral political process would be as effective in achieving social justice.
Although that may be true with respect to claims to which the majority

would assent, the electoral political process historically has been
notoriously unresponsive to the justice claims of subordinated groups.'
Civil-rights advocates of the 1950s and 1960s understood very well that
appeal to the federal courts was essential to their ultimate success; no

amount of work within the electoral political system would have

supplanted Jim Crow segregation laws.21 Although the federal courts

today have become a less sympathetic forum for rights discourse, the
current political climate hardly inspires confidence that the electoral
process can supplant litigation for the advancement of social justice.'
Glendon further criticizes American rights discourse for its tendency
to conceptualize rights as absolute in character, a tendency with two
unfortunate consequences. She argues that perceiving rights as absolute,
all-or-nothing entitlements, causes us to "express infinite and impossible
desires,"'

admitting no possibility of moderation or compromise.

Because all rights are conceived of as absolute, they are necessarily
imagined to be of equivalent weight and importance. As the list of
undifferentiated rights grows longer, this proliferation of rights tends to
cheapen our regard for the truly fundamental rights. Here, Glendon's
argument distinguishes between rights discourse as utilized within the legal
19. Glendon points to the historical development of property-rights discourse and
its astonishingly swift decline during the New Deal era to demonstrate the inherent
fragility of judicially created entitlements. GLENDON, supranote 1, at 20-32. One could
draw a contemporary parallel in the political inactivity induced in supporters of abortion
rights by the Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In the
aftermath of that decision, pro-choice advocates widely assumed that abortion rights
would be protected by the courts indefinitely, and failed to mobilize to counter the
political organizations of abortion opponents. As changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court put abortion rights in jeopardy, pro-choice activists had to begin belatedly
to cultivate the grass-roots political base that they had neglected during the intervening
years. See Douglas Jehl, .Pro7ChoiceGroup TargetsNine Politicians,L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1989, at Al.
20. See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 393-406
(1988) (discussing the ways in which theories of rights have both helped and hurt the
struggle for a more just society).
21. See, e.g., C. VANNWOODWARD, TEE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 111-47
(1974) (discussing the historical effect of Jim Crow segregation laws).
22. See Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, andthe FirstAmendment,
19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 67, 115 (1990) (discussing the federal courts' granting of
injunctions barring civil-disobedience demonstrations).
23. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 45.
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system and rights discourse in the culture at large. 24 Obviously, the legal
system recognizes that rights can be placed in a hierarchy of significance
and that one right can be balanced against other rights and even against
competing interests that are not themselves rights at all.' On the other
hand, if we consider popular cultural invocation of rights discourse, her
criticism does explain why rights talk is so often shrill in modulation and
reductivist in substance. It is this rigidity of popular rights talk, its
unbending insistence on its own primacy and power, that makes it both so
attractive as a rhetoric resource and so often ineffective as a tool of
persuasion. As Glendon convincingly argues, rights talk in popular culture
is a blunt rhetorical instrument.' The question that she sidesteps,
however, is how popular legal culture could be changed without
eviscerating rights discourse within the formal legal system, because she
identifies formal legal institutions and practices as a primary source of
popular legal culture. Moreover, for historically disempowered groups
seeking social justice, relinquishing the power of rights discourse would
be an unacceptably high price to pay merely to achieve a more temperate
public discourse.
If Glendon frequently overstates the negative impact of rights talk on
our society, she virtually ignores the positive benefits derived from
utilizing rights discourse. With the exception of a brief acknowledgement
early in the book that rights talk has been useful to minority groups in the
struggle for civil rights, she is unremittingly negative in her assessment of
rights discourse. Glendon at best pays lip service to the instrumental and
symbolic significance of rights discourse, obscuring what is at stake if we,
as a society, were to take up her suggestion and radically alter rights
discourse within our political system.
24. See id. at 16.
25. For example, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to a face-to-face confrontation with
adverse witnesses at trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Nevertheless, in a variety of
circumstances, this important constitutional right can be overcome by strong, but nonconstitutional, governmental interests. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 85758 (1990) (allowing a juvenile sexual-abuse complainant's testimony to be presented at
trial via one-way closed-circuit television monitors); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
164 (1970) (holding that hearsay evidence can be admitted against the accused even if the
declarant is not available for cross-examination at trial); Illinois v. Allen, 197 U.S. 337,
346 (1970) (ruling that a defendant whose courtroom demeanor is deemed too disruptive
can be physically removed from the courtroom and tried in absentia). Thus, even rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights do not always operate as "trumps."
26. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 3, 171-83.
27. See id. at 15, 171-85.
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Glendon essentially dismisses the historical fact that an appeal to
rights-based claims in the judiciary has been instrumentally effective,
particularly for racial minorities and women.' Rights are recognized as

"shields" against the exercise of legal power by all actors in the legal
system, thus serving to temper state power in ways that would not occur
absent the invocation of rights.' True, such rights-based appeals are not
invariably successful; but given the disproportionate lack of access to the
material wealth needed to compete in the electoral political arena,

subordinate groups should be loath to give up a strategy that has provided
some measure of legal protection to them. It is a fact of life, in our
media-dominated world that, expensive as litigation can be, it is
nevertheless cheaper than political mobilization and lobbying.3' For
groups with neither voter strength nor financial resources-the mentally
ill, for example-rights discourse may be the only plausible way to protect
their interests.'

In any event, pressing rights claims in the courts and other forms of
political action are not mutually, exclusive tactics. In fact, the act of
claiming rights can itself be politically energizing, leading to more

effective political mobilization and coalition building.32 Politically
committed lawyers have long appreciated the synergy generated between
courtroom struggles and other forms of political expression and
organization.
Nor is the instrumental expediency of rights discourse its only, or

perhaps even its major, positive contribution to our social order. The
discourse of law is more than just an instrumentalist tool, it is a "species
28. See id. at 6.
29. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEAL EDUc. 518 (1986) (providing a phenomenological account
of how an appeal to normative legal discourse acts to constrain judges).
30. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
JudicialReview?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 89 (1991) (discussing the higher costs of getting
legislation passed as opposed to challenging existing legislation in the courts).
31. See, e.g., BRUCE ENNis, PRISONRs OF PSYCHIATRY (1972) (examining case
studies that explain both how people's lives get disrupted once they are labeled mentally
ill and the enormous task these people must undertake within the courts to assert their
rights and to remove that label). See generally Horwitz, supra note 20 (discussing how
the modem, broad conception of rights has provided legitimacy and entitlement to the
weak and powerless far beyond what their actual political power could have produced).
32. For a specific instance in which rights discourse had this effect, see Judy Fudge,
The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon PoliticalDiscourse:Feminist Demands
and Sexual Violence in Canada, 17 INT'L J. Soc. L. 445, 446-47 (1989) (detailing the
Canadian experience in securing legal guarantees of sexual equality in the 1982 Charter
of Rights and Freedoms).
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of social imagination" that is "constructive of social realities rather than
merely reflective of them."' Law, like other cultural systems of

signification, both creates cultural meaning and mediates the way in which
we ascribe meaning to our experiences.Y Adopting what Clifford Geertz

calls this "interpretive turn,' 3- we cannot fully appreciate the importance
of rights discourse in our society without considering the role of rights

discourse as a system of encoded signification through which we project
meaning onto our experience.
Claiming a right is an act with potent symbolic significance in our
culture, for it is through this act, more than any other, that the claimant
achieves public acknowledgement of her status as a full-fledged member
of the community.1 Status as a full person, entitled to be heard, cannot

be claimed for oneself in private reflection but must be conferred by an
open and collective recognition of that status by others.37 The invocation

of a right is simultaneously a demand that a particular entitlement be
33. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative
Perspective,in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRMIVE ANTHROPOLOGY

232, 232 (1983).
34. For a more general discussion of the role of legal practice and doctrine in the
social construction of reality, see Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Casefor Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.
L. REv. 1083 (1991) (arguing that changes in the social construction of childhood over
time have affected the institutional practices of juvenile court, which in turn have
contributed to changes in the social imagination of childhood).
35. GEERTZ, supra note 33, at 233.
36. The importance of the semiotic aspect of rights invocation is emphasized in the
scholarship of Critical Race Theorists such as Patricia Williams, who wrote:
[For the historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of all
the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places one in
the referential range of self and others, that elevates one's status from human

body to social being. For blacks, then, the attainment of rights signifies the
respectful behavior, the collective responsibility, properly owed by a society
to one of its own.
PATRICIA J. WLIAmS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 153 (1991). For a law
review issue dedicated to discussingthe symbolic and practical aspects of rights discourse
for minority group members, see generally Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987) Lhereinafter Minority

Critiques].
37. Of course, this process is hardly unproblematic for subordinate groups whose
identity will be assessed by standards established by the dominant culture. For instance,
when the Mashpee tribe went to court to establish its legal tribal entitlements, their status
as a tribe became the pivotal issue. The Mashpees ultimately lost their case because their
identity was defined in terms of categories and assumptions not of their choosing. JAMES
CLIFFORD, Identity in Mashpee, in THE PREDiCANENT OF CULTURE: TnIETCENTURY ETHNOORAPHY OF LTERATURE AND ART 277, 277-346 (1988).
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conferred and an assertion that the claimant has the cultural standing to
bring this demand to our attention for adjudication. Even if the claimant
ultimately is unsuccessful in her substantive claim of entitlement, she has
been vindicated in her assertion that she qualifies as a potential bearer of
rights. Invocation of rights on the basis of group identity serves an
analogous symbolic function for groups that have been traditionally
excluded from the body politic." Given the centrality of rights discourse
within our cultural context, marginalized groups must partake in the legal
discourse of the dominant group to be acknowledged. In doing so, the
marginalized group establishes its claim to unconditional membership
status in the community at large."
At the same time, invocation of rights by subordinated groups links
their struggle to the historical struggles of other rights-claiming groups.
As a result, the symbolic aspects of rights discourse actively enhance its
instrumental value by providing a sense of solidarity, which can be
parlayed into more effective political organization. ° Unfortunately,
Professor Glendon addresses none of these symbolic attributes of rights
discourse as she urges us to abandon our culturally established dialect of

rights talk.
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the shortcomings of Professor
Glendon's cultural analysis of rights discourse is to examine her lengthy
discussion of abortion law, one of the primary examples she uses to
demonstrate that American rights discourse has a deleterious impact on
our political life by preventing us from reaching a satisfactory compromise
on critical issues. 4 Glendon characterizes the decision in Roe v. Wade4"
as interrupting what had been a developing trend among the various states
38. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals From
DeconstructedRights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987) (criticizing Critical
Legal Studies' rejection of the importance of rights assertion to blacks, other minorities,

and the poor).
39. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and
Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 337-41 (1987) (discussing the use and
transformation of mainstream consciousness by non-white Americans to their societal

advantage).
40. Elizabeth Schneider contends that rights discourse and politics thus exist in
dialectical interrelationship: "ITihe assertion or experience of rights can express a
political vision, affirm a group's humanity, contribute to an individual's development as

a whole person, and assist in the collective political development of a social or political
movement, particularly in its early stages." Elizabeth Schneider, The DialecticofRights
and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 589
(1986).
41. See GLENON, supra note 1, at 58-65.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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toward fairly liberal abortion statutes that, nevertheless, contained
restrictions reflecting the interests of the State in protecting fetal life.'
She dismisses Roe's attempt to balance the interests of the State against the
interests of the woman in bodily integrity and autonomy," calling Justice
Blackmun's trimester formulation "disingenuous." 45 The current state of
American abortion law, which Glendon sees as extreme and unbalanced,
is the result, she argues, of the absolutist and highly individualistic
character of the rights discourse concerning reproduction of which Roe
was merely the latest installment.'
Glendon contrasts American abortion law with that of the Federal
Republic of Germany, a nation whose rights discourse she considers more
balanced and nuanced than our own.47 She argues that West Germany's
legal response to the abortion issue exemplifies a rights discourse better
able to achieve political compromise between competing interests." In
West Germany, legislation permitting first trimester abortions was
declared invalid by the German high court, which declared that the
German legislature was constitutionally required to enact an abortion law
expressing legal censure of abortion.' Although the ruling stopped short
of requiring criminal sanctions in every instance of abortion, the result of
the German court's decision was to make abortion a criminal offense
unless two doctors give official medical certification that the abortion is
necessary because: the pregnancy presents the danger of great physical or
emotional injury to the mother; the fetus will be seriously deformed; or
the pregnancy resulted from rape.' As a practical matter, access to
abortion services in West Germany has been uneven, with abortion almost
43. See GLENDON, supranote 1, at 58.
44. The compelling state interest in maternal health constitutionally justified state
health regulations over abortion procedures performed in the first and second trimesters
of pregnancy, and the compelling state interest in preserving fetal life allowed a State to
proscribe post-viability abortions in the third trimester. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
45. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 59.
46. Id. at 58-65.
47. Id. at 70-74.
48. Id. at 62-65.
49. See Donald P. Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and West
Germany, 25 Am. J. ComP. L. 255 (1977) (comparing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roe to the West German Federal Constitutional Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of abortion in West Germany).
50. See K.C. Horton, Abortion Law Reform in the GermanFederalRepublic, 28
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 288 (1979) (discussing West Germany's abortion statute in light

of the West German Federal Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of
abortion in West Germany).
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impossible to obtain in the southern part of the country." Glendon
approvingly characterizes the German Supreme Court's position on
abortion as "less rigid" than that of its United States counterpart.52
Implicit in her discussion of the West German experience is her approval
of their abortion policy as a compromise solution, which we in the United
States would do well to emulate. A closer look at the German abortion
experience raises questions about the desirability of the German solution.
to the abortion issue. In their efforts to prosecute abortion violators,
German police have raided doctors' offices and seized confidential
doctor-patient records, resulting in conviction and imprisonment of
offending doctors.53 Even those women who have successfully qualified
for legal abortions are subject to post-abortion legal harassment, as when
nearly 200 women were forced to testify in open court about their
personal reasons for abortion because a tax auditor was investigating their
gynecologist.'
Recent events in Germany graphically prove that the German legal
treatment of the abortion question is far from being as successful an
instance of political compromise as Glendon suggests. East German
women, accustomed to a more liberal abortion law similar to that in place
in most other European nations, were so horrified at the prospect of living
under what they saw as the draconian abortion laws of West Germany that
German reunification nearly foundered on the issue.55 In a last-hour
negotiation to break the impasse, which had become a major stumbling
block in the reunification effort, it was agreed that the East German law
would continue to apply in the territory of the former German Democratic
Republic for two years after reunification, after which a new law for the
entire country would be drafted.'
If more evidence is needed that the German abortion law, far from a
balanced compromise worthy of our emulation, has engendered intense
controversy and conflict within the German social order, consider the
experience of Kathrin K., whose case sparked a public outcry in Germany
51. See Marc Fisher, Germany'sAbortionOrdeak In West, "Suspects"Face Forced
Medical Exams, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1991, at D1; Marlise Simons, A Divisive Issue
of German Unity: How to Reconcile Abortion Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1990, at Al.
52. GLENDN, supra note 1, at 62-65.
53. Nomi Morris, Tough Challengefor Germany-A Unoed Abortion Law, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 11, 1992, at A10.

54. Id.
55. Ferdinand Protzman, Abortion Shiing German Alliances, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
25, 1990, at A9.
56. Tyler Marshall, Accord Reached on German Unity Treaty, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
31,. 1990, at A10.
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and throughout the European community. 57 Kathrin K. and her husband
were returning by car to Germany from a short stay in Holland when a
search of their car by border police turned up incriminating evidence: a
nightgown, sanitary napkins, and some towels. Kathrin K. was
interrogated about whether she had recently had an abortion, and she was
taken first to a prosecutor's office and then to a local hospital for a
forcible internal pelvic examination to obtain evidence to prosecute her for
a suspected abortion. Although one doctor at the hospital refused to be a
party to a forced examination, the authorities found a second doctor who
agreed to perform the compelled examination. Upon finding evidence that
she had recently had an abortion, Kathrin K. was criminally charged with
having an abortion outside the country. It is a painfully ironic footnote to
her nightmarish ordeal that Kathrin K. had only recently become a
resident of the Federal Republic of Germany, having fled her East German
homeland three years earlier in search of freedom in the West.5"
The point of this discussion is not that the German legal response to
the abortion issue is an unsatisfactory one, although I believe that to be
true. Rather, the point is that if we accept Glendon's characterization of
Germany as a culture with a more balanced rights discourse than our own,
then her own chosen example amply demonstrates that a more symmetrical
discourse of rights and duties does not, and probably cannot, ensure social
consensus and successful political compromise of difficult issues.51
Regardless of how balanced and finely nuanced European rights discourse
may be, abortion is no less volatile and emotional an issue for Europeans
than it is for Americans.' What makes issues intractable to political
solution is not an absolutist rights discourse, but the existence of
competing interests of overwhelming importance to the political
protagonists. Such issues cannot be magically
tamed by banishing, or even
"refining" our dialect of rights talk. 61
Still less convincing is Glendon's claim that American rights discourse
is to blame for the dearth of social services available to pregnant women
and to mothers, with neither the government nor the private sector
57. Kathrin K.'s case should not be considered an isolated abuse. In the aftermath
of the publicity given her case, public-health physician Gerhard Ettlinger reported that
he knew of at least three hospitals used by police for forcible pelvic examinations of
women suspected of having undergone abortions outside the country. Fisher, supra note
51, at D1.
58. Id.
59. See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 32-40, 61-65, 145-62.
60. See, e.g., Anthony J. Blinken, WombforDebate: Europe'sAbortionLaws, NEW
REPUBLIC, July 8, 1991, at 12 (discussing the various European abortion policies and

conflicts arising between pro-choice and right-to-life groups).
61. See GLENDON, supranote 1, at 171-83.
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assuming any responsibility for financial, institutional, medical, or
emotional support for childbearing women.' Again, she contrasts the
American situation, in which individual women are abandoned by the state
and the community to fend for themselves in bearing children, with the
services available in Germany-and in most of Europe as well-including
counseling, medical care during and after pregnancy, and generous
financial assistance after childbirth. The blame for this contrast in
pregnancy and maternity policies, however, can hardly be laid at the door
of American rights discourse. As Glendon herself points out, rights
discourse was not applied to reproductive issues until the 1965 Supreme
Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut' established the constitutional
right for married persons to use contraceptives, and it was not extended
to abortion until 1973 with Roe v. Wade." Why, then, did the United
States government lag behind the other industrialized democracies in
providing social services for childbearing and child rearing, even before
rights discourse could have affected government policies in this area?
American hostility toward government social services in this context can
be better understood as symptomatic of a more generalized reluctance to
provide governmental assistance for any of the social needs of its citizens,
just as European benefits to mothers and mothers-to-be can be viewed as
just one small part of the cradle-to-grave social welfare systems of postwar Western Europe. Nothing about our history suggests that abandoning
rights discourse would encourage the development of a social welfare state
in contemporary America.
Glendon does supply a more convincing explanation for the American
resistance to European-style social welfare democracy when she indicts
our rights discourse for its extreme "hyperindividualistic" nature.' She
characterizes the paradigmatic actor in the American legal world as the
"lone rights bearer,"' imagined as an independent, autonomous self who
stands on his own two feet if he can, and has no claim against the
government or the community if he cannot. His most exalted value is self62. See id. at 65. In one of her characteristic off-hand generalizations, Glendon
suggests that conceptualizing the childbearing decision as a woman's personal right has
allowed men to claim that childbearing, and by extension child rearing, is likewise a
woman's personal problem. This, explains Glendon, gives men an excuse to evade
assuming any responsibility for the children they father. Id. at 66. I assume that this
assertion could only have been made tongue-in-cheek, given the abundant historical
evidencethat the phenomenon of certain men shirking paternal responsibility considerably
antedates the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; see GLENDON, supra note 1, at 56-61.
65. GLENDON, supra note 1, at 75.
66. Id. at 48.
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reliance, and his most cherished right is the right to be left alone. Glendon
asserts that the celebration in our legal culture of the "lone rights bearer"
has had two disastrous consequences.6' First, because laws are enacted
and interpreted with the autonomous, self-sufficient individual in mind, the
law inadequately provides for those persons unable to fit the model-such
as children, the disabled, and the elderly. Moreover, Glendon astutely
notes that laws incorporating the implicit assumption of the autonomous,
atomistic self have the effect of "perpetuat[ing] that way of being" by
creating legal incentives to adopt that mode of being."
Glendon suggests that there is a second negative consequence of
privileging the autonomous individual in our legal imagination. Because
we understand rights as belonging to individuals, our legal system is
peculiarly hostile to the possibility of communal rights and remedies. As
a result, we lack the conceptual vocabulary to articulate harms suffered
collectively by the community as opposed to harms suffered by individual
community members. In effect, these communal harms are invisible to a
legal order premised on individual rights and remedies. When a
neighborhood is destroyed by a highway project, or a plant closing
devastates a local community, the harm is simply not legally cognizable.
Glendon is surely correct to accuse individualistic rights talk of obscuring
the nature of collective and communal harms, thereby rendering these
harms unseen and unredressable.'
As I read her thoughtful consideration of the deleterious consequences
of American individualism, I could not help but wish that Glendon had
concentrated more on her critique of the ideology of individualism and less
on her attempt to tie it to her overarching meta-critique of rights
discourse. In the final analysis, her focus on rights discourse as the source
of so many contemporary social ills is unconvincing.
Perhaps one reason why her critique is unconvincing is that she fails
to situate her critique within its intellectual context. Although the reader
would hardly be aware of this from Glendon's book,' there has been a
67. Id.
68. Id. at 47-48, 74-75. Feminist legal scholars have pointed out the ways in which
the law privileges the world-view and experiences of the autonomous individual, and the
extent to which this vision distorts legal doctrine. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationshps, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1593 (1987) (analyzing the influence of assumptions about autonomy and independence
in search-and-seizure law and suggesting that these norms represent male values and

experiences).
69. See GLENDN, supra note 1, at 109-11.
70. She makes one or two oblique references to what she terms the radical critiques
of rights of the left and right, without specifying in what ways her own analysis parallels
and diverges with this other work. See id. at 7, 16.
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robust debate on the left of the normative value, intellectual coherence,
and political utility of rights discourse.71 It is disappointing, and frankly
puzzling, that her book fails to grapple with the substance of this rich
intellectual resource. If she had engaged with the scholarship of Critical

Race Theory, 2 it is unlikely that she would have paid so little attention
to the positive cultural symbolism of rights discourse for historically

marginalized groups. Similarly, her critique of the effect of
hyperindividualism on law would have benefited from comparison with
recent work in feminist jurisprudence pointing out the distortion in legal
doctrine and practice resulting from the law's incorporation of
androcentric values, including privileging the autonomous individual self
over the socially connected self-embedded in a web of relationships.' 3
In the final analysis, Glendon's book is unsatisfying because it is too
"thin" a description of our legal culture,74 ignoring many dimensions of
71. Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholarship attacked rights discourse for its
conceptual incoherence, its indeterminacy, its political inutility, and its ideological
mystification. See generally Symposium, A Critique of Rights, 62 Tax. L. REV. 1363,
1363 (1984) (discussing why ordering society in accordance with traditional notions of
individual rights retards progress on social-justice issues and suggesting ways in which
the terms of the debate may be redefined). In response, Critical Race Theorists criticized
the CLS position as insufficiently attentive to the instrumental usefulness and the
symbolic importance of rights discourse, particularly for minority group members. See,
e.g., Minority Critiques, supra note 36, at 301-447. For a Critical Legal rejoinder to
the Critical Race critique, see Horwitz, supra note 20, at 393 (defining the controversy
between the groups and discussing how the theories of rights have both helped and hurt
the struggle for a more just society).
72. See generally Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of
Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarsho, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990)
(describing Critical Race Scholarship).
73. Seegenerally Thel984JamesMcCorraickMitchelILecture:FeministDiscourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985) (discussing,
particularly in the contributions of Carol Gilligan and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, the
incorporation of masculine values of independence and self-sufficiency into legal
doctrine). For an application of feminist and critical theory to the issue of individual
rights, see Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
T X.L. REV. 387 (1984) (discussing the relevance of statutory rape laws and a concrete
critique of rights to the feminist struggle). More skeptical assessments of the utility of
rights discourse for achieving feminist goals include ELIZABETH A. KINoDOm, WHAT'S
WRONG WTH RIGHTS?: PROBLEMS FOR FEMINIST POLITICS OF LAW 46-84, 150-51
(1991), and CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAw 138-59 (1989).

74. I am contrasting Glendon's methodology with the "thick description" advocated
by Clifford Geertz. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive
Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTuRES 3, 3-30 (1973). By "thick
description," I mean an interpretive methodology based on multi-layered, contextualized
narrative, rather than on supposedly objective analysis. A thick description is multi-vocal,
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the cultural significance of rights and rights discourse in the context of our
pluralistic society. In her single-minded concentration on making her
cultural observations serve her meta-critique of rights, Glendon misses the
opportunity to make a more worthy contribution to our understanding of
multi-cultural legal reality.

accommodating multiple points of view. Id. at 5-10.
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CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION. By Richard A.
Posner. University of Chicago Press, 1990. Pp. 156. $18.95
Reviewed by Allen D. Boyer*
Ironically, in Richard Posner's book on Benjamin Cardozo,' the most
perceptive observation is one made thirty-years ago by Karl Llewellyn.
More than any other judge, Llewellyn wrote, Cardozo left an opinion "in
clean harmony with the authorities-duly explained; in such harmony that
on the point in hand it supersedes them. " 2
Llewellyn speaks about the apparent paradox of Cardozo's judicial
career-the way in which a shy, self-effacing judge helped forge modem
American law, twisting the last century's precedents inside out while
gently insisting that no change at all was under way.' To speak of
harmony carries a musical connotation. When opinion varies within the
common-law tradition, this suggests different voices should be heard as
elements of a common consort. The respect this expresses for judicial
harmony and counterpoint-its insistence that the law is both a steady
progression and a living tradition embodying different views-reflects an
understanding that this book never quite attains.
Posner opens with a concise biography, segueing from dates and
relationships into a survey of critical opinion. This is followed by a review
of The Nature of the Judicial Process,4 of which Posner writes:
"Speaking as a judge, I can say with some confidence that as a handbook
of the judicial craft the book is indeed pretty useless [although] it has real
merit as an exposition of a jurisprudential position" 5-namely, Cardozo's
belief in a "jurisprudence of pragmatism."6 Next come discussions of
Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co.7 and Hynes v. New York Central
Railroad," forming Chapter Three, "Cardozo's Judicial Technique." 9
* Member, New York bar.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

RICHARD A. PosNER, CARDozo: A STUDY INREPUTATION (1990).
KARL N. LLwELLYN, THE CoMMoN LAW TRADiTION 443 (1960).
See id. at 430-45.
BENjM/aN CARDozO, TiE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRoCESS (1921).
POSNER, supra note 1, at 19 n.38.
Id. at 28.
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 33-57.
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By Chapter Three, it is clear that Posner's deepest interest concerns
Cardozo's rhetoric. Throughout the book, Posner repeatedly emphasizes
this aspect of Cardozo's opinions. The following are some excerpts

exemplifying this point:
I emphasize Cardozo's rhetorical distinction and argue-what is
likely to prove, along with the proposition that reputation can
fruitfully be studied quantitatively, my most controversial
claim-that rhetorical power may be a more important attribute
of judicial excellence than analytical power.10
The power of Cardozo as of Holmes is to a great extent that of
a rhetorician-a poet-rather than that of an analyst, or of an
advocate or practitioner of pragmatic jurisprudence. 11
Influential or not, Cardozo certainly was and is eminent ....
Probably the most important factor is the rhetoric of Cardozo's
opinions. I include in this term not only his writing style narrowly
conceived but also the architecture of his opinions. The best of
them are memorable for the drama and clarity of their statements
of fact, the brevity and verve of their legal discussion, the sparkle
of their epigrams, the air of culture, the panache with which
precedents are marshaled and dispatched, the idiosyncratic
but
2
effective departures from standard English prose style.'
In stressing the rhetorical side of Cardozo's opinions, I may seem
to be belittling him. That is not my intention. .

.

. Just as

production is useless without distribution, so analytical power
is useless13without the power to communicate the results of its
exercise.
If I am correct that judicial eminence is-and rightly so--a
function in major part ofjudicial eloquence, we need more studies
of the literary dimension of opinion writing, and we need to begin
thinking about whether the decline in humanities education, which
both reflects and is reflected in the decline in the ability of
Americans, including judges, to write lucid and elegant prose,
10. Id. at x.
11. Id. at 56-57.

12. Id. at 126-27.
13. Id. at 136.
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requires 4 changes in the way in which we organize our legal
system.'
Even where Cardozo goes astray, Posner finds rhetoric at the heart of the
issue: "Although Cardozo's judicial prose is occasionally plumy, there are
many more analytic than stylistic flaws in his opinions. The characteristic
analytic flaw.., is the substitution of words for thought." 15 In short,
when Cardozo fails as a judge, it is because rhetoric has pushed him
where reasoning would not have led.
If rhetoric is effective, it should be capable of measurement. In
Chapter Four, "Reputation in General," 16 Posner entertains various
speculations on fame. Reputation may be enhanced, he suggests, by "the
generality, variety, and ambiguity of the reputee's work, or in short by its
adaptability to social, political, and cultural change."' 7 Reputation also
depends upon blind luck and upon politics." Character is also very
important.
Cardozo had an attractive persona because he was a nice man
who worked hard, soldiered on uncomplainingly in the face of
poor health, treated other people decently whether or not they
could help his career, and died young (for a judge!). He is valued
as a figure of the law and not just for his isolated professional
attainments and contributions.1 9
Living long can help, as it did for Justice Holmes; but so can dying
young, a factor which has helped George
Orwell. Ultimately, Posner
2
concludes, reputation varies unfairly. 0
There is a sing-song, yes-but-and tenor to this discussion, and the
reason soon appears: these observations are offered only as qualitative
preludes to a quantitative analysis. "Even to discuss coherently, let alone
to explain,
differences in reputation requires some means of measuring
it," 21 Posner explains. "Citation studies may be the means. " '
14. Id.at 148-49.
15. Id.at 119.
16. See id.at 59-73.
17. Id.at 60-61.
18. Id.at 62.
19. Id.at 65.
20. See id.at 62-66.
21. Id.at 69.
22. Id. While admitting that such studies are an "imperfect proxy for reputation,"
Posner states: "IMlost empirical studies of the use of citation counts to estimate the
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Accordingly, the text in Chapter Five, "Cardozo's Reputation:
Measures of Magnitude," turns statistical. A series of tables rank
Cardozo in terms of citations in law review articles. Consistently, he ranks
behind present-day figures such as William Brennan and William
Rehnquist and above such important state-court justices as Roger Traynor
and Walter Schaefer. Among other things, Posner presents the following
statistical chart:
Articles Mentioning Judges and Scholars'
Brennan
Rehnquist
Powell
Blackmun
Burger
Holmes
Frankfurter
Tribe
Black
Prosser
Harlan
Brandeis
Ely
Dworkin
Blackstone
Marshall

2,716
2,407
2,257
1,985
1,974
1,820
1,553
1,456
1,336
1,189
1,154
1,120
1,110
1,031
857
773

Hand
Jackson
Calabresi
Rawls
Wigmore
Michelman
Friendly
Cardozo
Bentham
Coase
Kant
Aristotle
Warren
Traynor
Nozick
Schaefer

679
660
656
618
597
577
551
499
499
438
365
356
320
312
279
59

Bar graphs show that Cardozo continues to be cited more often than
his fellow judges on the New York Court of Appeals and that he has
gradually gained on and finally outstripped his fellow Supreme Court
Justices Louis Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone.' Posner writes that
if we compare Cardozo's performance on the Supreme Court with
that of the average justice in terms not of citations by federal
courts but of number of citations by state courts, he clearly
dominates: 34.75 opinions to 20.16. And it is readily inferable
quality of sciences confirm the reliability of citations as an index of quality and rebut the
principal criticisms." Id. at 71.
23. _Jee id. at 74-91.
24. Id. at 78.
25. See id. at 80, 82-83, 86.

26. See id. at 87-88.
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. . .that Cardozo dominates the average justice if federal court
citations are added to state court citations. The exact totals are
106.7 federal and state citations to the average Cardozo opinion
versus 97.91 federal and state citations to the average opinion of
the other justices.2
One senses a rough equation here: the more effective the rhetoric, the
more frequent the citation, the greater the reputation, the more admirable
the rhetoric. Even on this level, the book is a craftsman's analysis of an
older master's work. That is both its value and its single greatest
This statistical analysis serves as the central trope of Posner's
fhilure.2
analysis. He relies heavily upon it, even devoting an afterward to
quantitative "Vistas of Research."' This suggests that Posner views
quantitative analysis of precedent as the solution to lawyers' declining
ability to read and write.
Another problem must be noted. In assembling his lists of judges and
academics, Posner has omitted many names, saying only: "the lists of
frequently mentioned judges and scholars . . . are illustrative, not
exhaustive; some omitted persons are mentioned more frequently than
some included ones."' This means that the tables which at first appear
so definitive and precise cannot be trusted any more than the facts
Cardozo recited in Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co. 1 To the extent
names are omitted and rankings changed, such quantitative analysis cannot
give an accurate estimate of reputation. If certain unknown judges turn out
to be cited and discussed more often than the well-known ones who have
made it onto the lists, the law is moving in ways Posner prefers not to
mention-and in ways Llewellyn would have rightly told us are ones we
need to study. 2
27. Id. at 89. Opinions are for the period 1932-1938, the dates of Cardozo's service
on the Supreme Court.
28. For an in-depth analysis of Cardozo's rhetoric, see Richard Weisberg, Law,
Literature and Cardozo's JudicialPoetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1979); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATuRE 293-96 (1988) (describing and critiquing
Cardozo's "ingenious use of metaphor"); Anon Y. Mous [pseudonym of Jerome Frank],
The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625 (1943) (stating that
Mr. Justice Cardozo's "'singularly facile and lucid English'" "has been praised without
published dissent").
29. POSNER, supranote 1, at 144.
30. Id. at 74.
31. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
32. See LLEwELLYN, supra note 2, at 45-51 (discussing the personal and
professional qualities of appellate judges).
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In focusing on the language of Cardozo's opinions, Posner gives little
thought to the institutional structures within which they were written,
approved, and issued. This is a serious shortcoming. No matter how
persuasive an individual judicial decision may be, its ultimate impact will
inextricably depend upon the character of the court from which it issues.
In writing Marbury v. Madison,' John Marshall gave the Supreme Court
the ability to overrule the other branches of the federal government. But
even though the Court held this power, judicial review would have meant
much less were it not for institutional changes, which Marshall also
wrought. First, by requiring that the Court issue a majority ruling in each
case brought before it (instead of having justices deliver personal opinions
seriatim), Marshall gave his Court a powerful, unified voice.' Second,
by not resigning at the end of the administration that had appointed him,
Marshall severed a crucial link between the Court and the political
process, dissolving any overt political alliance between Chief Justiceship
and Presidency.
Whatever the rhetoric in Marbury, these structural changes were
essential to the effectuation and legitimation of judicial review-yet any
purely linguistic analysis would have missed them. And although Posner
surveys cultural and social factors which may have contributed to
Cardozo's reputation, like his cultivation of academics, his saintly
mannerisms, and his prestigious position in the New York Court of
Appeals, the emphasis on rhetoric overshadows these matters. 5
Moreover, a greater defect is that this book often seems less interested
in the rightness of Cardozo's decisions than in how Cardozo persuades a
reader to accept his judgments-a characterization which follows Posner's
suggestion that judicial rhetoric may matter more than judicial analysis. Its
criticism of Palsgrafis couched in terms of bad rhetoric rather than
substantive injustice: "Cardozo goes beyond omissions, even misleading
ones, and makes up facts."' This lets Posner defend Cardozo against
charges of harshness: "whether the factual inaccuracies in Palsgrafor any
other opinion were conscious or not is impossible to say.""
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. See ALBERT MELONE & GEORGE MACE, JUDICIAL REvmW A
AMmcAN
DEMOCRACY 10 (1988) (discussing Marshall's efforts to make the Court a more unified
institution).
35. See POSNER, supranote 1, at 7-8, 129, 132.
36. Id. at 43.
37. Id. These charges have been damningly made out elsewhere. See JOHN
NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 111-51 (1976). Nonetheless, Posner
ultimately praises Cardozo for "his knack for broadening the applicability of his decisions
by selective presentations of the facts." POSNER, supranote 1, at 92.
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By addressing justice in terms of technique, Posner begs the question
of whether Cardozo succeeded in the judge's basic function. Bad decisions
are analyzed only in terms of deceptive rhetoric, not in terms of judicial
error or conscious malfeasance. This mistaken emphasis, ultimately,
deprecates both the methods of the judge and the result that he or she
seeks to achieve. Rhetoric is to be valued because it persuades and
establishes consensus. To treat rhetoric on a purely instrumental level
treats it as high-pressure salesmanship. And this sort of analysis, in
debasing rhetoric, denigrates the importance of consensus.

